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Abstract 
This research investigates the empirical assumptions behind the claim that leaders 
exaggerate the importance of their group’s goals more so than non-leaders and that they 
may use these beliefs to justify deviating from generally accepted moral requirements 
when doing so is necessary for goal achievement.  We tested these biased thought 
processes across three studies.  The results from these three studies established the more-
important-than-average effect, both for real and illusory groups. Participants claimed that 
their group goals are more important than the goals of others, and this effect was stronger 
for leaders than for non-leading group members.  In Study 3, we demonstrated the 
justification bias and connected this bias to beliefs about the importance of group goals. 
Participants indicated that they would be more justified than others in engaging in 
unethical behaviors to attain their group’s goals; leaders reported being more justified in 
such deviations than non-leaders; and the more highly leaders evaluated their group’s 
goals, the greater justification bias they reported.  
 
Keywords: Self-enhancement bias; more-important-than-average effect; group goals; 
leadership; unethical behavior; ethics; morality  
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Leadership and the More-Important-Than-Average Effect:  Overestimation of Group 
Goals and the Justification of Unethical Behavior 
 Social psychologists have recently shown an increased interest in understanding 
ethics and morality (Haidt, 2008), issues that have long concerned those in the field of 
philosophy.  For more than a decade now, philosophers working in ethical theory are 
have also paid greater attention to experimental work in social psychology (Doris, 1998, 
2002; Flanagan, 1991; Glover, 2000; Harman, 1999, 2003). Advocates of this approach 
to ethics claim that moral theorizing must be appropriately informed by research on well-
established psychological phenomena. How people think about morality, as well as how 
they are motivated by what they take to be its requirements, has important implications 
for what we can legitimately expect in terms of ethical behavior. Doris (1998, 2002), for 
example, uses studies on helping behavior and obedience to authority in his critique of 
virtue theories of ethics.  Contrary to the situationist perspective that dominates social 
psychology, advocates of virtue ethics assume stable behavioral dispositions. According 
to virtue ethicists’ empirically informed critics, social psychological findings give us 
reason to question the virtue ethicist’s claim that people can rely upon personal traits to 
behave morally across situations.  
 Social psychologists’ mounting interest in empirical ethics can thus provide data 
that either support or undermine the ethical thinking of philosophers.  One such empirical 
claim is central to the philosophical argument that leaders fail ethically not only because 
they believe they can get away with immorality but also because they believe that their 
goals are sufficiently important to justify deviating from moral requirements (Price, 
2006). This argument is based on a conceptual distinction between understanding the 
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content of a moral requirement—for example, that lying is generally wrong—and 
understanding the scope of that requirement—that is, whether the requirement applies in 
a particular case (Hampton, 1989; Price, 2006).  Given this distinction, leaders can accept 
a general moral requirement but believe that they are justified in deviating from it 
because they think too highly of their group goals. In short, leaders can believe that their 
rule-breaking behavior was not wrong after all. This theory of ethical failures in 
leadership lends itself to social psychological research because the assumptions that 
leaders will be inclined to overestimate the importance of their goals and that these biases 
are connected to beliefs about justification are ultimately empirical claims.  
In the social psychological literature, studies on self-enhancement phenomena 
typically focus on individuals’ perceptions of their own traits and behaviors relative to 
the traits and behaviors of others. Focusing the studies in this way may be important for 
understanding psychological mechanisms that explain why leaders sometimes behave 
immorally. Leaders’ beliefs that they are particularly virtuous or that their behavior is 
uncharacteristically ethical can compete with the view that they are capable of doing 
something immoral. However, ethical reasoning involves more than a leader’s views of 
his or her own traits and behaviors. For one thing, it involves the leader’s views about the 
importance of his or her group goals. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how an 
extension of self-enhancement phenomena can help us understand the way people, and 
leaders in particular, think about morality. We empirically address the following 
questions: Do people think that their group goals are more important than average? In 
other words, is there a more-important-than-average effect for people’s beliefs about 
their goals? Moreover, are these biases stronger for leaders than non-leading group 
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members?  Finally, is there any connection between these biases and beliefs about 
justification for engaging in unethical behavior in the service of their group’s goals? That 
is, do leaders who exaggerate the importance of their groups’ goals also believe that they 
are more justified than average. 
The More-Important-than-Average Effect 
 The self-enhancement bias, which results from comparative judgments with 
others at the individual level, is variously referred to as the better-than-average effect, the 
above-average-effect, the uniqueness bias, and the Lake Wobegon effect. According to 
Alicke and Govorun (2005, p. 85), our inclination to see ourselves in an 
uncharacteristically positive light is “one of social psychology’s chestnuts,” having been 
confirmed “in numerous studies, with diverse populations, on multiple dimensions, and 
with various measurement techniques.” Goethals, Messick, and Allison also note the 
pervasive differential between how we view others and how we view ourselves: “The 
uniqueness bias reflects our tendency to see ourselves as somewhat better than average, a 
tendency that has been observed in a wide variety of domains including vulnerability to 
major life events, driving abilities, responses to victimization, perceptions of fairness, and 
goodness” (1991, p. 19).  
Although the better-than-average effect is considered to be “one of the most 
robust of all self-enhancement phenomena,” (Alicke & Govorun, 2005, pg. 85) it has not 
been demonstrated to apply to the goals of the group to which one belongs.  In this 
context, to say that one’s goals are better than average means that they are more 
important than average. Yet there are good reasons to expect that the general effect 
extends to group goals. These reasons appeal to the sources and limitations of the effect 
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itself.  Self-evaluation biases have been shown to stem from both non-motivated (e.g., 
information processing limitations) and motivated sources (e.g., to see oneself in the best 
possible light; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). For example, the effect is stronger for 
moral qualities and behaviors than it is for non-moral traits such as intelligence—
precisely because the latter desirable traits, unlike the former, are easily tested against 
reality (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989).  The uniqueness bias is accordingly limited 
when there is low motivation to see oneself as better than others or when the behavior can 
easily be verified (Goethals, Messick, and Allison, 1991).  Because people’s beliefs about 
the importance of their group goals are desirable but not readily verifiable, the 
corresponding ratings of importance are likely to display self-enhancement biases. 
Enhancement biases in the group context.  Although the better-than-average 
effect has been empirically investigated as an individual-level phenomenon, there are a 
number of reasons to suggest that this effect likely extends beyond the self to aspects of 
meaningful groups to which people belong.  The highly influential and robust line of 
research on social identity theory provides strong support for this contention.  The part of 
an individual’s self-concept that derives from membership in social groups is referred to 
as a social identity (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  Considerable research on 
social identity theory has demonstrated that these social identities result in a number of 
cognitive biases that favor the ingroup and disadvantage the outgroup.  For example, 
ingroup favoritism refers to the tendency of people to view their own group more 
positively than other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979); the outgroup homogeneity bias 
denotes the tendency of people to oversimplify perceptions of outgroup members and 
have more diversified perceptions of ingroup members (Park & Rothbart, 1982); and the 
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group serving bias suggests that people make dispositional attributions for their ingroup 
members’ positive behaviors but situational attributions for their negative behaviors, and 
vice-versa for members of the outgroup (Heine & Lehman, 1997).   
The proposed more-important-than-average effect is consistent with the 
conclusion of the ingroup bias literature that people tend to view the ingroup more 
positively than other groups (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982).  For example, Sherif and 
Sherif (1953) found that group members evaluate their group’s products more positively 
than other groups’ products, and Price (2000) found that people made more optimistic 
judgments about their team members’ performance than about the performance of non-
team members. Not only do people prefer their own meaningful social group over others, 
but they also show preference for members of trivial ingroups including groups of people 
who share the same birthday, received the same flip of a coin, or prefer the same artist 
(Miller, Downs, & Prentice, 1998; Brewer & Silver, 1978; Billig & Tajfel, 1973).  
Because membership in a group engenders ingroup biases such that ‘we’ are seen as 
better than ‘they,’ there is reason to test the logical inference that ‘our’ goals will also be 
perceived as more important than ‘their’ goals.  
The justification bias. People have an astounding aptitude for self-justification 
(Tavris & Aronson, 2007), and one such method of absolving ourselves from 
responsibility may originate in perceptions of our groups’ goals.  Unlike personal goals, 
group goals are commonly thought to have special moral weight. After all, a large part of 
ethics education is getting people to think less about their own interests and more about 
the interests of the collective. Because group goals are often consistent with this social 
aspect of morality, it would not be surprising to find that people readily use group goals 
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to ground moral justifications of their behavior. So we predict that, in addition to 
perceiving that their goals are more important than average, people will also think that 
they have a special justification to engage in unethical behavior in the service of over-
valued goals. This justification bias is just what we should expect from the self-
enhancement literature: people are highly motivated to justify their morally questionable 
behaviors, and there are relatively few objective limitations on their ability to appeal to 
value judgments to do so.  
Leadership and the MITA and justification biases. Leadership is an important 
component of group life: leaders provide the vision, direction, and goals, and they use 
social influence processes to transform the individual action of group members into the 
collective action necessary to achieve those goals (Chemers, 2000; Messick, 2005).   
Because of their role, leaders have disproportionately greater power than do non-leading 
group members—both to set collective goals and to mobilize collective action toward 
those goals (Hogg, 2001).  Consistent with the ample social psychological literature 
demonstrating that people’s self-concept, or identity, strongly influences their beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors (Leary & Tangney, 2003), self-identification as group leader can 
guide the processing of information regarding their group. Hence, the proposed self-
enhancement biases regarding the importance of group goals and the related justification 
bias will likely be amplified for those who self-identity as group leader. After all, leader 
identity is strongly associated with the attainment of collective goals.  
The centrality of both setting and attaining group goals to the leader identity is 
further evidenced through people’s implicit leadership theories. Implicit leadership 
theories are people’s tacit beliefs regarding the traits, qualities, and characteristics of 
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leaders (Eden & Leviatan, 1975; Forsyth & Nye, 2008).  The content of these implicit 
theories is vast, but many of the assumptions focus on establishing objectives, structuring 
necessary tasks, and ultimately accomplishing group goals.  Thus, not only do we predict 
actual leaders of organizations will show an enhanced MITA effect over their followers, 
but we predict that to the extent people rely on these implicit theories when simply 
perceiving themselves as leaders, this enhanced MITA effect should be evidenced even 
when people are randomly assigned to leadership positions. Furthermore, in keeping with 
the prediction that overvaluing group goals may be accompanied by a greater justification 
to engage in unethical behavior, leaders should also demonstrate a greater justification 
bias than non-leaders. 
Research Overview 
 We employed a multiple study, multi-method approach to testing the following 
predictions: 1) people’s beliefs about their goals will exhibit a more-important-than-
average (MITA) effect—they  will hold that their group’s goals are more important than 
other groups’ goals; 2) people will demonstrate a justification bias—they will deem 
themselves more justified than others to engage in what is normally considered to be 
unethical behavior to attain their group’s goals; 3) both the MITA effect for group goals 
and the justification bias will be greater in leaders than in non-leading group members; 4) 
finally, we predict that the justification bias will be related to beliefs about group goal 
importance. These hypotheses were tested across three studies. In the first study we tested 
the MITA effect for group goals with leaders and non-leaders of university campus 
groups.  In Study 2 we sought to experimentally demonstrate the MITA effect for the 
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goals of illusory groups and in the final study we replicated and extended the second 
study by experimentally examining the justification bias prediction.    
Study 1 
With a particular emphasis on leaders, this study explored the extension of self-
enhancement biases to group goals.  In this study we contacted leaders and non-leading 
members of student groups and asked them to rate the importance of their group’s goals 
as well as other groups’ goals to test the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Participants will demonstrate a more-important-than-average effect 
with respect to group goals. 
Hypothesis 2: This effect will be stronger for leaders than for non-leaders. 
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and fifty-six undergraduate students at the University of Richmond 
participated in this study (17% First-years, 21% Sophomores, 29% Juniors, and 33% 
Seniors).  Participants included 58 male and 98 female leaders (n = 112) and non-leading 
members (n = 44) of university organizations.  The organizations targeted were student 
governments (for both of the male and female student coordinate colleges as well as the 
school of leadership studies), Greek organizations, political interest groups, and religious 
interest groups.  
Procedures 
Respondents were recruited during their organizations’ meetings and informed 
that they would be entered in a raffle to win one of a few prizes.  We employed two 
methods to gauge participants’ ratings of group goals: they ranked their goals in 
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comparison to others, and they assessed their and others’ goals on a 1 to 5 scale.  
Goal importance rankings for fund distribution.  Participants were asked to rank 
their group’s goals by responding to the following:   
The Director of Student Activities has decided to distribute funds to the current 
officially recognized student organizations, one of which is your organization. 
There are 100 such organizations. If the Director wants to distribute the funds 
based on the importance of each organization’s goals, where in the ranking 
should your organization be put for the distribution of funds? 1 = most important 
organizational goals and 100 = least important organizational goals (one 
organization per ranking).  
Goal importance scale. Participants were asked to select the best description of 
their group’s goals: unimportant (1), somewhat important (2), important (3), very 
important (4), and extremely important (5).  They were then asked to indicate the 
percentage of student groups on campus that have goals best described as being 
unimportant to extremely important. A final weighted rating of the goals of other 
organizations was created by multiplying the percentage of organizations reported in each 
category by the numerical value of the category and summing all five values.   
In another approach to gauge goal assessments, participants responded to the 
following two items on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree): ‘the goals of my student organization are important’ and ‘the goals 
of the average student organization on campus are important.’ The results from these 
questions directly parallel those of the goal importance scale discussed above, thus, for 
simplicity, we have not included these results. 
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Results 
Hypothesis 1:  Participants will demonstrate a more-important-than-average 
effect with respect to group goals.  First, we examined participants’ rankings of their 
group goals in the fund distribution questions.1 They were asked to rank their group’s 
goals on a scale from 1(most important) to 100 (least important). Similar to previous 
research on the above-average effect, we assessed this effect by conducting one-sample t-
tests against the midpoint on the scale, in this case, 50 (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, 
Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Alicke, Vrendenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001). 
Participants’ average ranking of their groups’ goals was 13.67 (SD = 5.53).  This ranking 
is significantly better than the 50th percentile (t(151) = -17.68, p < .00). In fact, 
participants ranked their group better than the 70th percentile (t(151) = -9.35, p < .00).   
In another approach to testing Hypothesis 1, we analyzed participants’ responses 
to the 5-point goal importance scale. We conducted a factorial ANOVA with one 
between-subjects factor (Leader) and one within-subjects factor (Self/Other).2  Analyses 
revealed that participants rated the goals of their group as significantly more important 
than the goals of other student groups (F (1, 132) = 105.43, p < .00, η2 = .44; self: M = 
3.78 SE= .08, others: M = 2.90 SE= .06). 
Hypothesis 2: The more-important-than-average effect will be stronger for 
leaders than non-leaders.  First, we conducted a one-way (Leader) between-subjects 
ANOVA on the fund distribution group goal importance rankings (again, rankings were 
made from 1[most important] to 100 [least important]). There was a significant main 
effect of Leader such that leaders’ rankings attributed greater importance to group goals 
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than did the rankings of non-leaders (F (1, 150) = 10.23, p < .01, η2 = .06; leaders: M = 
11.10 SE= .05, non-leaders: M = 21.66 SE= .12). 
We also tested this hypothesis on the 5-point goal importance scale by examining 
the simple effects tests from the mixed-factorial ANOVA (B: Leader, W: Self/Other).  
These tests revealed that leaders rated their group goals as being significantly more 
important (M = 4.03, SE= .09), as compared to non-leaders (M = 3.54, SE= .14; simple F 
(1, 132) = 8.85, p < .01, η2 = .06), but there was no difference in leaders’ ratings (M = 
2.96, SE= .06) and non-leaders’ ratings (M = 2.84, SE= .10) of the group goals of others 
(see Figure 1).   
Discussion 
The results from this first study established what we call the more-important-
than-average effect: participants claimed that their group goals are more important than 
other people’s group goals.  Furthermore, the more-important-than-average effect was 
stronger for leaders than for non-leading group members. These findings are quite robust, 
as they were consistently supported across a variety of measures ranging from the fund 
distribution ratings to two additional approaches for measuring assessments of goal 
importance. 
Study 2 
Study Overview and Hypotheses 
In Study 1 we demonstrated that the MITA effect was indeed stronger for leaders 
than for non-leading group members. Although we contend that this effect is driven by 
the self-identification as group leader, because we studied actual group leaders and non-
leading members we cannot rule out alternative explanations implicating factors 
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associated with people who become leaders. For example, we can assume that some of 
these individuals became leaders of their groups precisely because of beliefs about the 
importance of the groups’ goals. So, in this second study, we sought to test 
experimentally the prediction that the MITA effect is driven by people’s self-conception 
as leaders, rather than factors that explain why they become leaders in the first place. If 
simply perceiving oneself as a leader is sufficient to activate implicit leadership theories 
(Forsyth & Nye, 2008), we should be able to demonstrate the MITA effect in those 
randomly assigned to the leader position.  To test this explanation, we conducted an 
experimental study in which we randomly assigned participants to the role of leader or 
non-leading member of a group and assessed how important they deemed their groups’ 
goals to test the same hypotheses tested in Study 1. 
Method 
Participants and Design  
One hundred and seventy undergraduate students at the University of North 
Carolina—Chapel Hill participated in this study (67 men and 103 women).  Participants 
were recruited to participate before their classes began. The experiment employed a 2 
(Leader: Leader, Non-leader) by 3 (Group: Business, Service, Political) between-subjects 
design. 
Procedures 
Participants were given a vignette with the following instructions: ‘For the 
purposes of this survey, imagine that you are the leader (or non-leading member) of a 
business (or service, or political) organization on campus.  Please take a minute to think 
of yourself as the leader (or non-leading member) of this kind of organization and then 
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complete the following items.’  
 Goal importance. As in Study 1, participants were asked to select the best 
description of the goals of their student organization: unimportant, somewhat important, 
important, very important, and extremely important. In addition, they were asked to 
indicate which of these best describes the goals of the typical organization (political, 
service, or business) on campus.   
Results 
Hypotheses 1& 2: Participants will demonstrate the more-important-than-average effect 
and leaders will demonstrate a stronger MITA effect.  
 To test these hypotheses, we analyzed participants’ responses to the goal 
importance assessments by conducting a factorial ANOVA with two between-subjects 
factors (Leader and Organization) and one within-subjects factor (Self/Other).  As 
predicted, there was a main effect of goal importance such that all participants rated their 
own group’s goals as significantly more important than other groups’ goals (F (1, 164) = 
48.12, p < .00, η2 = .23; own: M = 3.76 SD= .84; other: M = 3.35 SD= .93).  
Additionally, in support of the second hypothesis, there was a significant interaction 
between Self/Other and Leader (F (1, 164) = 5.72, p = .018, η2 = .03). Simple effects 
tests revealed that leaders rated their group’s goals as being significantly more important 
(M = 3.90, SE= .09) than did non-leaders (M = 3.60, SE= .09; simple F (1, 164) = 5.59, p 
= .019, η2 = .03), but there was no difference in leaders’ and non-leaders’ ratings of the 
importance of the typical group’s goals (M = 3.37, SE= .09, M = 3.36, SE= .10, 
respectively, see Figure 1).  We included organization type as a factor to test whether the 
relationship between leader and goal assessment differed across types of organizations.  
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Analyses revealed that the three-way interaction between goal assessment, leader, and 
organization was not significant (p = .245).  
Discussion 
 In Study 2, we both replicated the more-important-than-average (MITA) effect for 
group goals found in Study 1 among members of real university groups, and we 
demonstrated that this effect extends to people assigned to imaginary groups.  In addition, 
people randomly assigned to the role of group leader showed a stronger MITA effect than 
those assigned to the role of non-leading group member, again replicating and extending 
the findings from Study 1. Because participants were assigned to the position of 
leadership, the enhanced MITA effect for leaders appears not to be a peculiarity 
associated with choosing to take on a leadership position but, rather, the result of a more 
general cognitive bias associated with the leader role.   
Study 3 
 In Study 3 we set out to replicate the experimental findings by demonstrating both 
the MITA effect for participants assigned to illusory groups and a greater MITA effect 
for those assigned to the leader condition.  We also sought to link perceptions of the 
importance of one’s goals to the belief that one is justified in deviating from general 
moral requirements. Thus, we wanted to test three additional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Participants will think they are more justified than others in 
breaking basic moral rules to achieve group goals. 
Hypothesis 4: Leaders will report a greater justification bias than non-leaders. 
Hypothesis 5: Ratings of group goal importance will be positively correlated with 
this justification bias. 
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Method 
Participants and Design  
Ninety-one undergraduate students at the University of Richmond participated in 
this study (28 men and 63 women).  The experiment employed a 2 group (Leader: 
Leader, Non-leader) between-subjects design. 
Procedures 
Participants were given a vignette with similar instructions as in Study 2; 
however, instead of imagining they are the leader or non-leading member of a specific 
type of group (business, service, or political), they were simply asked to imagine being a 
leader or non-leading group member of an organization on campus.   
 Goal importance. Participants responded to the following two questions: ‘The 
goals of my organization are best described as being…,’ and ‘The goals of typical 
organizations on campus are best described as being…’ by circling one of the following 
response options: unimportant, somewhat important, important, very important, and 
extremely important. 
 Justification assessment. Using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree), participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the following 
items: ‘In some circumstances, it would be alright for me to misrepresent the facts in 
order to achieve the goals of my organization,’ ‘In some circumstances, it would be 
alright for me to misrepresent the facts in order to keep a key group member in the 
group,’ ‘In some circumstances, it would be alright for me to misrepresent the facts in 
order to keep a rival group from doing better than us,’ ‘When I have to misrepresent the 
facts, the goals of my organization serve as a justification for my actions,’ and ‘For the 
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good of the group, I would be justified in doing what other people might think is 
unethical.’ Participants then responded to the same items in reference to either leaders or 
non-leading members of other groups depending on their condition. The Cronbach’s αs 
for the self and other justification measures were .90 and .91, respectively.  
Results 
Hypotheses 1& 2: Participants will demonstrate the more-important-than-average effect 
and leaders will demonstrate a stronger MITA effect.  
 We analyzed participants’ responses to the goal importance assessments by 
conducting a factorial ANOVA with one between-subjects factor (Leader/Non-leader) 
and one within-subjects factor (Goal assessments: Self/Other).  There was a main effect 
of goal assessments such that all participants rated their own group’s goals as 
significantly more important than other groups’ goals (F (1, 89) = 61.88, p < .00, η2 = 
.41; own: M = 3.73 SD= .83; other: M = 3.00 SD= .84).  Additionally, in support of the 
second part of this hypothesis, there was a significant interaction between goal 
assessment and leader (F (1, 89) = 8.62, p = .004, η2 = .09). Simple effects tests revealed 
that leaders rated their group’s goals as being significantly more important (M = 4.04, 
SE= .12) than did non-leaders (M = 3.41, SE= .11; simple F (1, 89) = 15.21, p = .000, η2 
= .15), but there was no difference between leaders’ and non-leaders’ ratings of the 
importance of typical group’s goals (M = 3.04, SE= .13, M = 2.96, SE= .13, respectively, 
see Figure 1).   
Hypotheses 3, 4 & 5: Participants will demonstrate a justification bias, leaders will 
demonstrate a greater bias, and this bias will be positively correlated with perceived goal 
importance. 
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 To test hypotheses 3 and 4, we analyzed participants’ responses to the 
justification questions with a factorial ANOVA with one between-subjects factors 
(Leader/Non-leader) and one within-subjects factor (Justification: Self/Other).  There was 
a main effect of justification such that all participants rated themselves as being more 
justified than others (F (1, 89) = 15.17, p < .00, η2 = .15; self: M = 2.98 SD= 1.35; other: 
M = 2.58 SD= 1.21).  In addition, there was a main effect for leader condition such that 
leaders reported greater levels of justification (M= 3.03, SE= .19) than non-leaders (M= 
2.54, SE= .19; F (1, 89) = 4.05, p = .047, η2 = .04). The interaction between justification 
and leader was not significant (p = .39).  Based on a priori predictions, we examined the 
simple effects and found that leaders did report greater agreement that they would be 
more justified in breaking standard moral rules to achieve their groups goals (M = 3.27, 
SE= .20) than non-leaders  (M = 2.69, SE= .20; simple F (1, 89) = 4.38, p = .039, η2 = 
.05; see Figure 2).  However, the difference in leaders’ and non-leaders’ ratings of others’ 
level of justification was not significant (M = 2.79, SE= .18, M = 2.38, SE= .18, 
respectively).  Additionally, as evident in the main effect for justification, both leaders 
and non-leaders reported that they would be more justified than others; however, this 
effect was stronger for leaders (simple F (1, 89) = 11.20, p = .001, η2 = .11) than for non-
leading group members (simple F (1, 89) = 4.65, p = .034, η2 = .05). 
 To test hypothesis 5, we created a justification variable by subtracting other 
justification from self justification; thus, higher numbers indicate a bias in perceiving 
oneself as more justified than others.  This method of computing the justification bias 
variable is based on similar methods employed by Major, Quinton and Schmader (2003) 
and Hoyt, Simon, and Reid (2009). There were three outliers in the justification bias 
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variable; we replaced the outliers with the next closest value.  Second, we ran a 
correlation analysis between the justification bias variable and the participants’ 
assessments of goal importance. This analysis revealed a significant positive correlation, 
r (89) = .21, p = .05.  Finally, we examined this correlation within leader conditions and 
found that the relationship between justification bias and goal assessments was 
significant only for leaders (r (43) = .31, p = .04) and was not significant for non-leaders 
(r (44) = .06, p = .72). 
Discussion 
 In this final study, we successfully replicated the more-important-than-average 
effect found in the first two studies.  Group members indicated that their group goals 
were more important than other groups’ goals, and leaders showed this bias to a greater 
degree than non-leading group members.  In support of our hypotheses about the 
justification bias, both leaders and non-leaders thought they were more justified than 
others in engaging in what is normally considered unethical behavior in the service of 
their group goals, and leaders reported greater levels of justification than non-leaders.  In 
other words, participants—especially leaders—were inclined to see the behavior in 
question as more permissible when it was carried out by them as compared to when it 
was carried out by others. This finding is very much in keeping with the distinction noted 
in the introduction between the content and scope of a moral requirement: people can 
accept a general moral requirement but decide that it does not apply to them in their 
particular circumstances.  As we also expected, the more important leaders thought their 
group’s goals were, the more justified they thought they were in doing the 
characteristically unethical act to attain these goals. So leaders’ beliefs about the morality 
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of their actions were connected to their beliefs about goal importance. However, we did 
not find this effect for non-leading members.  This finding supports the claim that leaders 
have a special justificatory connection to the goals of their groups. When goal 
achievement is at stake, leaders appeal to the importance of group goals to justify 
engaging in what are usually thought of as ethically questionable behaviors. Justification 
for non-leaders does not seem to be similarly related to beliefs about the importance of 
group goals.  
General Discussion 
“Moral justification is a powerful disengagement mechanism. Destructive conduct is 
made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it in the service of moral ends.”  
Albert Bandura 
The goal of the present research was to use empirical evidence to substantiate the 
philosophical claims regarding of the psychological underpinnings of unethical 
leadership.  First, the results from these studies established what we call the more-
important-than-average effect: participants claimed that their groups’ goals are more 
important than other groups’ goals.  Notably, the more-important-than-average effect 
occurs in both intact and illusory groups, and it is stronger for leaders than for non-
leading group members. In Study 3, participants indicated that they would be more 
justified than others to engage in unethical behaviors to attain their group’s goals, leaders 
reported being more justified than non-leaders, and the more highly leaders evaluated 
their group’s goals, the greater justification bias they reported.  
Theoretical and Applied Implications, Limitations, and Future Research 
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This research has a number of implications for psychological theory—particularly 
for social cognitive theory, which is devoted to understanding self-enhancement biases 
associated with social comparisons.  First, although the better-than-average effect has 
been demonstrated in a wide variety of domains from driving ability (Svenson, 1981) to 
perceptions of fairness (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985), this research 
further extends the scope of self-enhancement biases to perceptions of the importance of 
group goals as well as to justifications for engaging in unethical behavior to attain group 
goals.  Our finding are consistent with Goethals et al.’s (1991) assertion that the better-
than-average bias is more prominent with respect to characteristics that are not easily 
tested against reality, as the objective importance of group goals and justification for 
unethical behavior are indeed not empirically verifiable.  Confirmation of the more-
important-than-average effect is also consistent with the conclusion from the abundant 
ingroup bias literature that people prefer what is associated with their own group over 
what is associated with other groups (Tajfel, 1982). 
 Additionally, this research contributes to a greater theoretical understanding of the 
role of groups in the understanding of the self.  We have shown how self-enhancement 
biases extend to group goals. Extending the bias to group goals, which are collective in 
nature, may explain the willingness of leaders to use these goals to justify unethical 
behavior. Within the group, collective achievement normally has greater moral weight 
than the pursuit of self-interested aims. In addition, however, our research points to an 
important moderator of self-concepts and their effects on justification. The role one 
occupies within the group also makes a moral difference and our findings indicate that 
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leaders may conceive of their selves in a more interdependent manner than do other 
members of their groups.   
Furthermore, we demonstrated the robustness of the more-important-than-average 
effect by showing that it applies not only to leaders and non-leading members of real, and 
arguably meaningful, groups but also to members of less meaningful minimal groups 
(Billig & Tajfel, 1973).  Our ability to induce the MITA effect for group goals in 
participants randomly assigned to imaginary groups, some as imaginary leaders, suggests 
that the bias stems from self-identification within the group. The enhanced bias 
demonstrated by leaders points to a special connection between their roles and their 
perceptions of the importance of group goals. Future research should examine the 
elements of a leader’s self-conception that give rise to these enhanced biases by further 
examining the extent to which belonging to, and being a leader of, a group affects the 
way leaders think about themselves and their groups. In addition, since we did not 
directly test the process in this research, there is an alternative explanation that future 
research can examine. It might be the case that the enhanced MITA effect for leaders 
stems from the effects of experiencing power (Galinsky, Jordan, and Sivanathan, 2008) 
as opposed to conceiving of oneself as a leader.  
Notably, this research also contributes to the literature on the role that social 
cognitive biases may play in unethical behavior (Werhane, 1999; Messick & Bazerman, 
1996; Goodpaster, 2007).  Previous research on the self-serving bias has shown that 
people think they are more ethical and they have greater virtues than others (Baumhart, 
1968; Hoorens, 1993).  Indeed, 50% of respondents rated their morals higher than 90 on a 
scale from 1-100 (100 being perfect; Lovett, 1997).  Even social psychologists are not 
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immune to viewing themselves as being more ethical than their colleagues in social 
psychology (Van Lange, Taris, & Vonk, 1997).  Although people who think they are 
more moral than others may be more responsive to increases in accountability 
(Novicevic, Buckley, Harvey, & Fung, 2008), an unfounded confidence about our morals 
and values may sometimes blind us to our own potentially unethical behavior. We can be 
led astray when we ignore morality, but we can also fail ethically when we are convinced 
that morality is on our side.  Future research can further examine this relationship, 
perhaps by presenting participants with less abstract and more cognitively and 
emotionally involved moral scenarios.  
The findings presented here provide additional evidence that self-enhancement 
biases—in particular, the tendency to overestimate the importance of group goals—may 
give rise to leader’s beliefs about the justification of what would ordinarily be considered 
unethical behavior.  In Study 3, we demonstrated a strong relationship between leaders’ 
justification bias and their estimation of the importance of their group’s goals; however, 
our study provides only correlational evidence.  Future research should manipulate the 
perceived importance of group goals to determine the extent to which these beliefs 
causally impact justification for unethical behavior. It is also important to gain a greater 
understanding of why this relationship exists only for leaders and not for non-leaders.  A 
greater understanding of the thought processes involved in moral justification should help 
leaders make better decisions and avoid ethical failures. For one thing, advocates of 
ethical leadership may need to worry less about the selfishness of leaders than about the 
readiness of leaders to overestimate the importance of group goals. As we have 
demonstrated, leaders are particularly willing to put their groups’ goals ahead of the goals 
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of other groups. We will therefore need new responses to unethical leadership if the 
causes of leader immorality go against conventional wisdom.   
Summary 
 In recent years, we have seen ever-increasing media coverage of immoral 
behavior on the part of elite leaders, oftentimes with catastrophic results.  This research 
tested assumptions related to the philosophical assertion that, in large part, these failures 
stem from cognitive biases connected to people’s beliefs about the importance of group 
goals (Price, 2006).  By examining leading and non-leading members of university 
groups, we found empirical evidence for these biases: people demonstrate a more-
important-than average effect for group goals, and the more-important-than-average 
effect on perceptions of group goals is stronger for leaders than it is for non-leading 
group members.  By experimentally assigning people to leader or non-leading positions 
within groups we replicated the more-important-than average effect and the enhancement 
of this bias for leaders in studies 2 and 3.  Finally, in Study 3, we demonstrated that 
people think they are more justified than others in engaging in what is typically 
considered to be morally deviant behavior to achieve their groups’ goals, that leaders 
showed a greater justification bias than did non-leaders, and the leaders’ justification bias 
was correlated with perceived importance of group goals for leaders.  
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Footnotes 
1Although the funding questions had participants rank goals from 1 to 100, we treat the 
data as interval level with our statistical procedures.  That is, we are treating this data 
similar to the way most social scientists treat ordinal Likert scale items.  In support of this 
approach, a review of the literature concluded that “for many statistical tests, rather 
severe departures (from intervalness) do not seem to affect Type I and Type II errors 
dramatically” (Jaccard & Wan, 1996: 4). Additionally, these variables were positively 
skewed; the application of a square root transformation removed the skewness.  We back-
transformed the variables in order to present them in meaningful units. 
2Because of the unequal sample sizes across conditions, we have employed the General 
Linear Model using Type III sums of squares (comparing unweighted means) and we 
report the estimated marginal means (Howell, 2004).  Additionally, a few participants 
failed to accurately complete the measure which explains any discrepancy between the 
degrees of freedom and the sample size. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Leaders’ and non-leading group members’ ratings of their own and other 
groups’ goals across all three studies.  
Figure 2: Study 3: Leaders and non-leading group members’ ratings of their own and 
others’ justification in engaging in unethical behavior to achieve the group’s goals. 
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